Contract manufacturers sell capacity under different terms to different buyers. In a common practice, the supplier offers a market standard price and lead-time combination for products listed in its catalog. At the same time, it strikes contracts with some high-volume customers who require recurring delivery of a custom product at a short notice, usually timed to meet the buyer's production schedule. Whereas the manufacturer is obligated to satisfy demand from these customers, it can dynamically choose which transactional orders to accept. In this paper, we analyze two scenarios. In the first scenario, the manufacturer produces contractual orders on a make-to-order basis, and in the second, it maintains finished goods inventory for such orders. At each decision epoch, the manufacturer decides which transactional orders to accept to maximize its long-run expected profit. When contractual items are made to stock, the manufacturer also chooses how much extra capacity to allocate to contractual items, over and above what is needed to meet realized demand. We establish the structure of the optimal policies and propose scalable heuristics when optimal policies are hard to compute/implement. Our models are then used to study the effect of demand variability on the optimal profit. We also show how the amount of capacity available, relative to demand, changes the desirability of serving either transactional-only or both markets.
Introduction
Many contract (custom) manufacturers of componentsand manufactured materials such as steel, plastics, and glass-face demand from two types of customers. A large number of one-off orders are from transactional (type-2) customers who are offered a market-standard price and lead-time combination for product families listed in the manufacturer's catalog. At the same time, annual contracts are struck with some high-volume contractual (type-1) customers who require recurring delivery of a custom product at a short notice, usually timed to meet the buyer's production schedule. The key difference is that the supplier is obligated to satisfy orders from the latter (or incur shortage penalties), whereas it can select which transactional orders to satisfy without penalty. However, once a transactional order is accepted, it must be satisfied within the promised delivery time, or else tardiness penalties accrue.
We model two scenarios. In the first model, called the MTO production mode, all orders are produced in a maketo-order (MTO) fashion, whereas in the second model, referred to as the MTS-MTO mode, the manufacturer may produce contractual items in the make-to-stock (MTS) fashion. The MTO model is appropriate when the contract is for total business volume and the actual item demanded by the contractual customer might change from one order to another, or inventory is perishable/too expensive to hold. It is also appropriate for certain service providers, such as cargo carriers, who offer different lead times at different prices (standard and premium services). In both models, the manufacturer observes type-1 and type-2 demands at discrete decision epochs and decides how many type-2 orders to accept to maximize the expected total discounted profit. When type-1 items are made to stock, the manufacturer also chooses how much extra capacity to allocate to type-1 items, over and above what is needed to meet the realized demand. We formulate the manufacturer's problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) and prove certain properties of the optimal value function, which are then used to obtain optimal/heuristic policies.
In the MTO scenario, the relevant decision is how many type-2 orders to accept. We show that this decision depends only on the total backlog of type-2 items and not on their due dates. We then prove that the optimal acceptance policy is an easy-to-implement threshold policy that specifies an accept-up-to level (booking limit). When manufacturers can produce to stock, the corresponding MDP has multidimensional state and action spaces, and the optimal value function does not appear to have any useful structure, which makes it difficult to compute an optimal policy. Therefore, we present two implementable heuristics. Our approach can be used to address several managerially important issues. For example, it is possible to quantify the benefit to a manufacturer of negotiating contracts that limit the variability of type-1 demand by offering limited quantity flexibility to the buyer. Our analysis also shows that serving only transactional orders may be more profitable when capacity is tight. Finally, our models can help evaluate the incremental benefit of each extra unit of capacity and of having longer market-standard lead time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2, we provide a particular example that is partially responsible for our interest in this class of problems. This section also contains a brief literature review. The manufacturer's problem is formalized in two mathematical models. Notation and model formulations are presented in §3, followed by analyses in § §4 and 5. We present tests of goodness of heuristics, as well as managerial insights, in §6 and concluding remarks in §7. The online appendix is available at http://or.pubs.informs.org/Pages/collect.html.
Motivating Example and Literature Review
We are motivated, in part, by our interactions with an integrated steel mill (ISM) that makes many different types of finished steel coils; for example, galvanized, tin-or chrome-plated, or hydro formed into tubes. Each product also has a unique dimensional and steel-grade specification, with the result that the ISM produces literally thousands of end products. However, the basic production steps and the process sequence are, by and large, the same for all end products with the exception of the final step that may involve processing through a different finishing line (see Denton et al. 2003 for details). Moreover, marginal production costs per ton of steel are more or less product independent, and ISMs have little pricing latitude on account of intense competition. The ISM is the preferred supplier of steel to several automobile manufacturers, who sign annual contracts for custom-made products and require reliable delivery within the bounds specified by the contract. Such contracts, which account for nearly 60% of the ISM's annual production (in tons), are renewed if the ISM maintains or exceeds the specified delivery performance standards. The ISM is contractually bound to satisfy demand which is dictated by the weekly build schedule of the automakers, making it necessary to carry finished goods inventory in many instances. These customers provide a demand forecast, usually on a quarterly basis, which is used to carry out rough-cut capacity requirements planning. The quarterly forecast is updated only if there are market factors that lead to substantial revisions in the build schedule of the buyer. On a weekly basis, the buyers reveal the exact demand for the ensuing period. Deviations from the forecast are common for a variety of local production factors that are not known to the steel mill. That is, demand uncertainty is not resolved until late in the process. The contractual customers do not necessarily generate more profit per ton.
Primary processes that produce molten steel must remain operational round the clock on account of the high cost of restarting after a shut down. Therefore, ISMs remain profitable by carefully managing the portfolio of contracts with transactional customers, who place one order at a time and order from a number of different competing steel makers. In this environment, account managers usually offer a menu of prices and fixed lead times up front to build market share. Note that order booking, production planning, and order fulfillment occurs in weekly time buckets, although transactional orders arrive continuously over time. Transactional orders are made to order due to the large number of end products in the ISM's product catalog. If a transactional order cannot be delivered by the promised delivery date, then it is treated as a high-priority order in subsequent planning periods. Customers are allowed to change/cancel orders until the next booking decision epoch, i.e., the start of the next week's production cycle.
We now turn our attention to a review of related literature on order selection and production decisions when customers are differentiated by quoted lead times. Quoted lead times can indicate both lead times that are fixed in advance and known by the firm (as in this paper) and lead times that are determined dynamically according to the state of the system. In the latter approach, order selection process is exogenous to the firm; see Keskinocak and Tayur (2004) for a review. Our approach is also different from Duenyas and Hopp (1995) and Chatterjee et al. (2002) , where customers make the accept/reject decisions based on dynamically quoted lead times.
In a closely related work, Carr and Duenyas (2000) model both accept/reject and production control decisions when the production facility is a two-class M/M/1 queue. While their work is motivated by an application similar to ours, there are several important differences. In Carr and Duenyas (2000) , type-2 customers are not quoted lead times, and waiting cost is incurred over the entire time their orders remain in the system. In our approach, longer lead times for type-2 customers improve the manufacturer's capacity utilization as well as its ability to meet contractual obligations. Whereas Carr and Duenyas show that the optimal policies are characterized by monotone switching curves, in our model, the optimal policy must also specify the amount that will be produced and the number of type-2 demand that will be accepted.
Several recent papers model a manufacturer's production and inventory decisions when it sells capacity to different customer classes. A key distinction between these papers and our models is that they do not model order selection by the manufacturer. For example, Sobel and Zhang (2001) and Frank and Zhang (2003) consider models in which contractual customers' demand is deterministic and transactional demand is, respectively, either backlogged or results in lost sales. In Cattani et al. (2003) , the manufacturer offers custom and standard products. The latter can be produced via a more efficient standard capacity, and therefore the focus of this research is on identifying the manufacturer's capacity purchase and specialization choices. Dobson and Yano (2002) formulate an integer programming problem that can be used to compute the best choices of product offering, prices, and MTS/MTO decisions simultaneously. All products are made on a shared production facility and demand decreases linearly in both price and lead time. The key distinction between their model and our approach is that we consider random demand, whereas in their model demand occurs at a constant rate. Charnsirisakskul et al. (2004) formulate a deterministic mixed-integer programming model for the problem of order selection, due date setting, and production scheduling. They carry out a numerical study to compare the relative benefits of due date flexibility and the flexibility to serve partial orders.
Model Formulation
We model the manufacturer's problem as a discrete-time, infinite-horizon MDP. A separate model is presented for the MTO and the MTS-MTO production modes. Bold-face and upper-case notation indicates vectors and random variables, respectively (to avoid confusion with lower case L, we use script ). All parameters are stationary, i.e., they do not depend on the period index. Formalization of these models requires the following common notation:
= one period production capacity (integer valued). = promised delivery time for transactional customers 2 . D j = type-j demand (random, nonnegative, and integer valued).
r j = revenue (contribution margin) from each type-j demand (assumed nonnegative). h 1 = inventory carrying cost rate for type-1 items. h 2 = tardiness penalty rate for not meeting a type-2 demand within periods. p = per unit lost sales penalty/additional cost of satisfying type-1 demand by spot market/subcontractor purchases.
= one-period discount rate, where 0 < < 1. We adopt the convention that the lead time for contractual orders is one period and the minimum lead time for transactional orders is two periods. This stems from the fact that demands are realized at the start of a period and that the earliest that supply and demand matches can occur is at the end of that period.
The manufacturer gives higher priority to type-1 orders when making production decisions because future contracts are dependent on delivery performance. Using marginal analysis, the benefit of using a unit of capacity to produce a type-1 item is p + r 1 , whereas the worst-case cost is r 2 + h 2 / 1 − , which happens when a type-2 order remains perpetually backlogged as a result of this action. Therefore, a sufficient condition under which it is optimal to give higher priority to type-1 orders is r 1 + p r 2 + h 2 / 1 − . In some numerical tests we performed, giving higher priority to type-1 items is optimal so long as p + r 1 > r 2 + h 2 , a much weaker condition. On a different note, it is reasonable to expect r 2 r 1 , but we make no such assumption in our models. However, this relationship is assumed in our numerical examples.
The vector s = s 1 s −1 denotes the backlog of type-2 orders at the start of a period. For each j < − 1, s j 0 denotes the number of type-2 orders that have waited precisely j time periods, whereas s −1 0 denotes the number of type-2 orders that have waited at least − 1 periods. If these orders are not filled by the end of the current period, then the manufacturer will incur a tardiness penalty for each remaining order in s −1 . Orders that are already tardy at the start of the current period incur a tardiness penalty in earlier periods, and therefore we need not keep track of the due dates of orders that are more than − 1 periods old. Cash and material flows occur at the end of each period, whereas operational decisions are made at the start of each period.
The MTO Production Scenario
The manufacturer observes s and realized demands d 1 and d 2 , and then chooses how many type-2 orders to accept, denoted by a s d 1 d 2 to obtain the following optimal value function:
where · + equals max 0 · , m ∧ n equals min m n , and the argument of a is suppressed for notational convenience. The terms on the first line above denote contribution and lost sales penalty from type-1 demand, and the currentperiod tardiness penalty for type-2 orders. The terms on the second line contain the expected benefit from using leftover capacity for type-2 items and the optimal future benefit from the next period forward. Vector s denotes the system state at the end of the current period, which is determined according to the following system dynamics equations:
for j = 2 3 − 2 and
The MTS-MTO Production Scenario
The state of the system is now described by i s , where i denotes the inventory level of type-1 items. The manufacturer makes two decisions: (1) how many extra type-1 items to produce (i.e., in excess of min
, and (2) how many units of new transactional demand to accept. Let v i s denote the optimal value function when the state is i s . Then,
Key components of (3) are as follows. When the manufacturer decides to produce x units of type-1 items, where
, and to accept y units of the realized type-2 demand, where 0 y d 2 , it earns r 1 i + x ∧ d 1 from type-1 customers and r 2 −1 m=1 s m +y ∧ −x from type-2 customers. After supply-demand matches occur, the type-1 inventory level is i + x − d 1 + , whereas the type-2 backlog vector, denoted by s , is determined as follows:
−2 and
The inventory holding and tardiness costs are, respectively,
The MTO Production Model
The MDP described in (1) is computationally challenging because its state space is the − 1 -fold cross product of nonnegative integers, i.e., s ∈ 0 1 × · · · × 0 1 . However, as we show in Theorem 1 in EC.2 of the ecompanion, the value function in (1) is the sum of well structured functions of the partial sums of s j s. The nature of the value function, in turn, results in a relatively simple form of the optimal acceptance policy. Why does the order selection policy depend only on s and d 1 ? This phenomenon can be explained with the help of the following intuitive arguments. In view of the fact that type-1 orders have higher priority, a random amount of capacity (equal to − D 1 + ) is available in each future period to meet type-2 orders. Moreover, type-2 orders are served in the order of arrival. Therefore, the benefit from accepting each additional type-2 order, which depends on when it is served, is a function of the total backlog of type-2 orders and the exact amount of leftover capacity available in the current period. The latter is determined by d 1 .
Effect of Model Parameters
We study the effect of input parameters on a manufacturer's expected profit and acceptance policy through two types of comparisons. This section is devoted to stochastic comparisons, whereas §6 presents numerical experiments. Stochastic orders have been used in many recent studies to facilitate comparisons; see Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) and Müller and Stoyan (2002) for details. We are concerned here with the concepts of stochastically ordered demands according to the usual, convex, and increasing concave orders, denoted, respectively, by st , cx , and icv . For random variables X and
Ef Y for all increasing (respectively, convex or increasing concave) functions f for which the expectations exist.
Proposotion 1. (a)
The optimal expected profit v s , as shown in (1) 
Part (a) above follows from observing the right-hand side of (1), which confirms the required effect of each model parameter for an arbitrary order-acceptance policy, and hence also for the optimal policy. Part (b) is proved in Appendix B. Note that X st Y ⇒ X icv Y and Y cx X ⇒ X icv Y (see Müller and Stoyan 2002 for details) . Therefore, part (b) above confirms the intuition that the manufacturer will reap greater benefits when it faces a more consistent and larger type-2 demand. At first glance, one might be tempted to conclude that larger type-1 demand is also beneficial. This turns out not to be true in general. We present a counter example in §6. Proofs of parts (c) and (d) are presented in Appendix C.
The MTS-MTO Production Model
The MDP described in (3) is considerably more difficult to analyze. In fact, we have been able to obtain limited results that apply only to the = 2 case. If > 2, the -dimensional optimal value function, v i s , is neither concave nor expressible as a sum of well-structured functions. Moreover, even if one could compute the optimal action pair for each state i s and demands d 1 and d 2 , the resulting + 2 -dimensional look-up table quickly becomes impractical to store.
Analysis for = 2
We show that when = 2, v i s is jointly concave in i s . This helps streamline the computation of the optimal policy. Define 1 
Then, the properties of v i s are as stated in Theorem 2 (see EC.3 of the e-companion for a proof). 
Even though the value function is well behaved, the structure of the optimal policy is quite complex (results are not shown in the interest of brevity). For each instance of the problem, the optimal action pair x * y * depends on the quadruplet i s d 1 d 2 ; it cannot be obtained from pre-calculated thresholds.
Heuristics
We present two easy-to-implement heuristic policies that are consistent with observed properties of the optimal policy when = 2. We also obtain an upper bound.
Heuristic H1. The first heuristic converts a problem with > 2 to an equivalent problem with = 2 and tardiness penalty rate h 2 = h 2 / − 1 ; the -dimensional state is converted to an equivalent two-dimensional state via the transformation s = −1 m=1 s m . That is, the time allowed for delivering type-2 items is shortened to two periods, and the per-unit tardiness penalty is commensurately reduced. The main advantage of H1 is the reduced computational effort. We store the maximizing actions, Heuristic H2. This heuristic specifies two critical numbers: the maximum type-1 inventory I and the maximum workload S, which can be used to determine the production and order acceptance decisions and the corresponding value function, v LB2 . For each given I S pair, type-1 demand is met up to i + . If d 1 < i + , then capacity is used to increase type-1 inventory up to I. After that, any leftover capacity is used to reduce the backlog of type-2 items. This means actions x and y can be recovered from parameters I and S via the following operations:
We use a two-dimensional exhaustive search for finding the optimal I and S.
The Upper Bound (UB). The upper bounding value function is obtained by setting h 2 = 0. Now, because there are no tardiness costs, the manufacturer should admit all type-2 orders that arrive. It can be shown by induction that v UB , the corresponding value function, does not depend on the distribution of current type-2 backlog by due dates (this result is also intuitive because the information on due dates is redundant if one does not charge tardiness penalty 
Evaluation of v UB i s requires no more computational effort than what is needed to obtain the value function for the problem with = 2. When capacity is insufficient relative to total demand, accepting all type-2 demand poses computational challenges because s becomes unbounded. In such cases, we obtain the upper bound by assuming ample type-2 demand. Now the manufacturer admits exactly what it can produce in each period and carries no backlog. Specifically, s + D 2 ∧ − x in the first line of Equation (5) is replaced with − x and the system state is captured entirely by i.
Numerical Experiments
In principle, the optimality equations in (1) and (3) can be solved via either value iteration or policy improvement algorithms. In practice, this is difficult because our model has infinite states and such algorithms will require an infinite number of operations at each iteration. Therefore, we use an approximate value iteration algorithm, which is adapted from Puterman (1994, pp. 239-243) . (Key steps of our approach can be found in EC.4 of the e-companion.) In the remainder of this section, we present numerical examples to compare the performance of bounds and heuristics and to illustrate managerial implications of our models.
Accuracy of Bounds and Heuristics
Input parameters (data) used in tests of accuracy of bounds and heuristics can be found in Table 1. Table 2 shows the various bounds for E v i s . We used the approximate value iteration algorithm to find v i s for each state i s and discrete-event simulation to estimate the steady-state probabilities under H1 and H2. Together, these quantities were used to calculate E v i s . The remaining experimental design is as follows. 1  10  20  25  1  2  5  5  0 9  2  5  20  25  1  2  5  5  0 9  3  15  20  25 
The base case, labeled Case 1, is listed in the first row. For each case, we provide the expected profit corresponding to the two heuristics and the upper bound when is either 2, 3, or 5. Note that when = 2, the H1 heuristic is optimal. For H2, we also provide the optimal values of the policy parameters, denoted as I * and S * . We systematically vary the input parameters of our models. Each time a different parameter is set first lower, and then higher, than the base case, with all other parameters remaining at their base values. The total number of individual problem instances solved is 51. In each case, the percent differences between H1 and the upper bound are reported as % 1 , whereas the corresponding quantity for H2 is % 2 . The only exception to this is the row corresponding to = 2, when in each case, % 2 shows the difference between H2 and the expected optimal (or H1) value.
The aggregate performance of the two heuristics is as follows. For = 2, H1 is optimal and therefore the corresponding value of % 1 is a measure of the goodness of the upper bound. The average gap in the 17 experiments reported is 2.51% and the maximum gap is 4.79%. H2 is generally more accurate and in each problem instance, % 2 becomes smaller as increases. This is particularly satisfying as we can expect the heuristic to continue to perform well for large . The average values of % 2 are 1.55%, 1.87%, and 0.61% for equal to 2, 3, and 5, respectively; whereas the corresponding maximum values are 4.43%, 3.51%, and 3.98%. Overall, the average % 2 is 1.34%. The average % 1 values are 1.50% and 3.50% with = 3 and = 5, respectively. The corresponding maximum errors are 2.75% and 18.53%, respectively.
To highlight parametric insights from Table 2 , consider the effect of varying r 2 and E D 1 , which is studied in Cases 4 and 5, and 12 and 13, respectively. In Cases 4 and 5, smaller (larger) r 2 is associated with smaller (respectively, larger) S * . In Cases 12 and 13, larger E D 1 lowers optimal profit. Although we do not know the expected optimal value for = 3 and 5, both lower and upper bound with larger E D 1 are smaller than the lower bound with smaller E D 1 . This example therefore shows that when the manufacturer is contractually bound to satisfy type-1 demand, larger demand from such customers does not necessarily improve optimal profits, even when > E D 1 .
Managerial Insights
We observed in Other relevant parameters are = 0 9, r 1 = 10, r 2 = 20, p = 25, h 2 = 2, = 10, and = 2. With these data, the optimal profits are E v s = 1 322 1 and E v s = 1 372 5, confirming that larger type-1 demand might not be beneficial. We also investigated the effect of demand variability on E v i s in the MTS-MTO model. For brevity, these results are not shown. We observed that a higher coefficient of variation of D 1 (respectively, D 2 ) lowers expected optimal profit and that a higher variability of D 1 is more detrimental. This is partly because the manufacturer can mitigate the effect of variability of D 2 by having the flexibility to serve type-2 orders over periods. Figure 1 plots the percent type-1 demand that is lost due to supply-demand mismatch (left vertical axis) and expected profit (right vertical axis) as a function of the production capacity, which is expressed as a proportion of the expected type-1 demand. It shows that the manufacturer needs to have significantly more capacity than mean type-1 demand if shortages must be kept small. The MTO and the MTS-MTO approaches are very close. In fact, profit differences are not distinguishable when either /ED 1 > 1 5 or /ED 1 < 0 5. Similar experiments were also performed by varying E D 1 , rather than . These experiments showed that higher E D 1 can be detrimental, even when r 1 > r 2 , in situations where /ED 1 is not significantly more than one.
In Figure 2 , we compare the option of serving only type-2 demand with the option of serving both types of demands in either the MTO mode or the MTS-MTO mode. Data are the same as above, except h 1 = 1 is the only case considered. Note that the option to serve both types of demand dominates the option to serve only type-1 demand because the manufacturer can always achieve profits equal to the latter strategy by simply deciding not to accept any type-2 orders. However, as Figure 2 shows, it is possible that serving only transactional orders might be more profitable. Note that the MTO and the MTS-MTO modes generate similar profits. † In all 17 cases, the value of % 2 in the row corresponding to = 2 shows the difference between H2 and the expected optimal (or H1) value. Effect of production capacity, calculated as a proportion of the mean type-1 demand, on type-1 lost sales and optimal profit. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present two models for a contract manufacturer who sells production capacity to two different types of customers under different terms. The manufacturer exercises control over how many transactional orders to accept and on how much extra capacity to allocate to the production of contractual items beyond what is needed to meet demand in the current period. We show that a threshold policy that depends only on the total backlog of transactional orders is optimal when all production occurs in the MTO mode. For the MTS-MTO mode (i.e., when the manufacturer may produce contractual items to stock), a two-critical-number policy performs well, although the Interaction between production capacity, calculated as a proportion of the mean type-1 demand, and optimal profit in different markets. optimal policy has a complicated structure. In many examples, MTO and MTS-MTO modes generate similar profits. A manufacturer can adapt our approach to quantify the benefits of better negotiated contracts with type-1 customers. For example, the manufacturer can negotiate the maximum capacity that it can be expected to make available to the contractual customers in each period. Alternatively, buyer's quantity flexibility can be constrained, e.g., by defining a minimum and a maximum purchase quantity in each period.
Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the online version that can be found at http://or.journal. informs.org/ecompanion.html.
Appendix
Throughout this section, we use s j q to denote j m=q s m , and and to denote the sets of integer and real numbers, respectively. A real-valued function + → is defined to be concave if and only if s +1 − s is nonincreasing in s. We also define F as the set of all + → functions that are nonincreasing and concave. Similarly, is the set of functions such that if ∈ , then (1) is concave, and (2) 1 − 0 r 2 . It is easy to verify that if ∈ F , then ∈ . (Condition (1) applies because is concave, and condition (2) follows from the fact that 1 0 ⇒ 1 − 0 0 < r 2 Lemma 1 in EC.1 proves certain properties of functions in and F , and Theorem 1 in EC.2 establishes a key property of the optimal value function v s for the MTO production model. These results are used in the proofs presented below.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
From the optimality Equation (1) and Theorem 1 in EC.2, for a fixed realization d 1 of type-1 demand and a fixed realization d 2 of type-2 demand, the optimal action is obtained as follows:
is concave from the fact that d 1 ∈ . Next, we define
Taking the difference between d 1 s and d 1 s − 1 when d 1 , we have
Thus, when d 1 , we have
In the above, the second equality comes from (A1). The last equality follows from the definition of b
B. Proof of Proposition 1(b)
We will show thatv s v s for all s. To keep the notation simple, we present the arguments with = 2. The same arguments also extend to situations when > 2 with straightforward changes. The proof is by induction on n. For n = 1, we havē
+ is increasing and concave for all s, it follows that v 1 s v 1 s for all s, so the result holds for n = 1. For an arbitrary n > 1, suppose thatv n s v n s for all s. For a realization d 1 of type-1 demand, we define
· is concave from Theorem 1 and part (a) of Lemma 1 (both can be found in the e-companion). Let
be the optimal accept-up-to level for type-2 demand in period n for the problem with demand sequence D 2 . An optimal policy for an MDP with demand sequence D 2 prescribes actionā *
where we define V
d 2 is an increasing and concave function in d 2 0.
By (B2),ā * n s d 1 does not depend on the distribution of D 2 in period n, so it follows thatā * n s d 1 is also an optimal action in state s at period n with demand D 2 . So,
Finally, we obtain
In the above, inequality (B5) follows from (B3) and the assumption that D 2 icv D 2 . Inequality (B6) follows from (B4) with a s d 1 = a * n s d 1 , where this particular a s d 1 is an optimal action in state s, for a realization d 1 of type-1 demand in period n with demand sequence D 2 . Finally, the last inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis. So, the result holds for n + 1. To complete the proof of the theorem, note thatv n →v and v n → v as n → . Therefore, the result will hold for the optimal value functions ofv s and v s for all s. We show complete details only of the proof that b * d 1 is increasing in , where d 1 is a realization of type-1 demand. The proofs of sensitivity with respect to r 2 , h 2 , are similar (therefore omitted). We also show how our arguments help establish the fact that
We consider two scenarios in which one-period production capacities are and¯ , respectively, with ¯ . We attach a "bar" (¯) to denote higher production capacity; e.g., v · denotes the MDP value function with capacity¯ . To keep the notation simple, we present the arguments with = 2. The same arguments also extend to situations when > 2 with straightforward changes. The proof relies on the following three arguments:
(1)v n s −v n s − 1 v n s − v n s − 1 for all s 1 and each n 0.
(2)
Recall that n is the iteration index in the value-iteration algorithm. The function n represents the terms within the maximization operator in Equation (EC2) in EC.2 of the ecompanion. That is,
s + a . We will show that the first argument is true by induction on n and for each n, if argument (1) holds, then it implies that arguments (2) and (3) also hold. Because the value iteration needs to be performed an infinite number of times, we arbitrarily initiate the process by setting v 0 s =v 0 s = 0 for all s 0. Thus, the first argument above is trivially true for n = 0. Using this terminal value function, we observe that
where I · is the indicator function. Inequality (C7), together with concavity of the function
(see part (a) of Lemma 1 in EC.1 of the e-companion), implies that
Thus, the three arguments hold when n = 0.
Next, we assume that argument (1) is true for all t n, where n 0 is an arbitrary integer, and show that this implies that arguments (2) and (3) must hold for n and argument (1) must hold for n + 1. For s 1, we use the fact that for any m and n, m ∧ n = m − m − n + . Then, we have
where we define n x = −r 2 x + + v n x + , x ∈ . Becausē v n is concave andv n 1 −v n 0 r 2 (see Theorem 1 in EC.2 of the e-companion), n is concave. This argument can be proved using steps similar in the proof of part (a), Lemma 1 in EC.1 of the e-companion. Here we omit details in the interest of brevity. Therefore, we have
The first inequality is a consequence of the concavity of n and the fact that s − ¯ − d 1
The second inequality comes from applying the induction hypothesis (argument (1)). An immediate consequence of (C8) is that
0. Therefore, from the definition of the optimal acceptance level when capacity is¯ , we havē b * n d 1 b * n d 1 . Now, to complete the proof, we need only prove that the first argument holds for n + 1. From (EC2) in EC.2 of the e-companion, for every realization d 1 of type-1 demand, we have 
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (a): We shall prove concavity of g 1 s when s ∈ + . Because + ⊂ + , it immediately follows that concavity should hold when g 1 is defined over integer points.
Let g 1 s = r 2 s − r 2 s − x + + s − x + = r 2 s + f 1 f 2 s , where f 1 u = −r 2 u + u and f 2 u = u − x + . It is easy to see that f 2 · is convex. In view of the fact that is concave and 1 − 0 r 2 , it follows that f 1 · is nonincreasing and concave. Furthermore, the composition of a convex function with a nonincreasing concave function is concave. Therefore, g 1 · is concave, being the sum of concave functions. Next, consider
, the right-hand side equals 1 − 0 r 2 . Otherwise, it equals r 2 + 0 − 0 = r 2 . Therefore, g 1 1 − g 1 0 r 2 and the proof of part (a) is complete. Part (b): Upon performing a simple variable transform, we see that ∀s 0, g 2 s = max s t s+j t . Let t * = arg max t t 0 be a nonnegative maximizer of the function . Then, from the concavity of , it follows that 
Therefore, g 2 s + 1 − g 2 s is nonincreasing in s and g 2 s is concave.
In order to establish that g 2 1 − g 2 0 1 − 0 , we need to consider three different cases in a parallel set of arguments. For 1 + j t * , we have g 2 1 − g 2 0 = 1 + j − j 1 − 0 , where the inequality follows from the concavity of . For 0 < t * < 1 + j, g 2 1 − g 2 0 = t * − t * = 0 1 − 0 . The previous inequality holds because is concave and t * > 0. Finally, when t * = 0, g 2 1 − g 2 0 = 1 − 0 . Part (c): For each realization x of the random variable X, let g x 3 · denote the value of the function g 3 . Then, g x 3 is concave being the composition of a convex function s − x + with a decreasing concave function . Furthermore, g x 3 ∈ F because is a decreasing function. In view of the fact that X is independent of s, concavity and monotonicity are preserved upon taking expectations. Therefore, g 3 ∈ F . 
where ∈ , and f 1 f 2 f l−1 ∈ F .
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction, where we use the value iteration algorithm to establish the nature of v n s for each n. The value function at the n + 1 th iteration is determined recursively by the following expression: 
where the functions f n ∈ F and n ∈ for all s. The proof is completed by showing that this structure also holds for n + 1.
To prove that the result holds for n + 1, we first rearrange (EC2) as 
Therefore, the induction hypothesis holds for n + 1. Moreover, because v n s → v s as n → , v s possesses the properties of each v n s .
EC.3. Proof of Theorem 2
The optimality Equation (3) n and v n are integers. Because the domain of a concave function must be a convex set, for the purpose of this proof, we assume i s and a b ∈ + 2 . If concavity holds over this enveloping convex set, it should also hold for the same functions when they are defined over integer points.
Note that Theorem 2 holds trivially for n = 0 when we set v 0 i s = 0 for all i s . Assume the following inductive hypotheses hold for all i s and t n:
